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1953] RECENT DECISIONS 141 
CIVIL PRoCEDuRE-JunaMENTs-R.Es JunrcATA EFFECT oF DECLARATORY 
JunaMENTs-In a former action brought pursuant to the Colorado Declaratory 
Judgment Act, 1 plaintiff was declared to have the right to use a certain roadway 
1 Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935), Rules of Civil Procedure, c. 6, rule 57, p. 223. 
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as dedicated and defendant was enjoined from interfering with or obstructing 
plaintiff's use of the same. Thereafter, plaintiff brought the present action to 
recover damages allegedly resulting from defendant's blockading of the road 
prior to the bringing of the former action. On appeal from a judgment for 
plaintiff, held, reversed. Where, as here, the damages were antecedent and 
might with propriety have been determined in the same proceeding in which 
the declaratory judgment alone was sought, such judgment should operate as a 
bar to any subsequent claim therefor. Lane v. Page, (Colo. 1952) 251 P. (2d) 
1078.2 
Both the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act3 and the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act,4 which Colorado has adopted, provide that declarations "shall 
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree." It is generally agreed 
that a declaratory judgment is res judicata as to the right therein adjudicated,5 
provided of course that a justiciable controversy6 is presented. However, the 
principal case is in apparent conflict with the weight of authority as to whether 
a subsequent action based (I) on the right adjudicated in the declaratory 
proceeding, and (2) on facts or conditions which existed prior to, but were not 
raised in, the declaratory judgment is barred by res judicata. 7 In holding that 
the subsequent action is not so barred it has been asserted either that it would 
be unreasonable to hold that a court had jurisdiction to determine the rights 
of the parties, but that the successful party had no remedy to enforce such 
rights after they had been determined,8 or that the remedy to enforce such 
rights as determined by a declaratory judgment is intended to supplement 
2 It does not appear from the decision whether plaintiff in the second action was 
attempting to avail himself of the further relief provision of the Colorado statute, c. 6, rule 
57(h), p. 224. To the effect that a party who has a justiciable and accrued cause of action 
may not avail himself of a declaratory proceeding see Edwards v. Edwards, 90 Cal. App. 
(2d) 33, 202 P. (2d) 589 (1949); Pitzer v. City of East Chicago, 222 Ind. 93, 51 N.E. 
(2d) 479 (1943). 
a 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2201. 
4 9 U.L.A. 234, §1 (1951). 
5 Morecroft v. Taylor, 225 App. Div. 562, 234 N.Y.S. 2 (1929); Great Northern Ry. 
Co. v. Mustad, 76 N.D. 84, 33 N.W. (2d) 436 (1948). See 2 .ANDERSON, DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENTS 1079, §459 (1951). 
6 For a discussion of the concept of justiciable controversy see "Developments in the 
Law-Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949," 62 HAnv. L. REv. 787 at 794 et seq. (1949). 
The justiciable requirement is founded on the fact that federal courts and most state courts 
cannot give advisory opinions. See Conroy v. Civil Service Comm., 75 Cal. App. (2d) 
450, 171 P. (2d) 500 (1946), where a declaratory judgment was held subject to collateral 
attack on the grounds that the controversy determined thereby was non-justiciable. 
7 Lynch v. Bailey, 99 N.Y.S. (2d) 585 (1950) (plaintiff's failure to demand damages 
when he secured a declaratory judgment against a partnership held not a bar to a subsequent 
action for damages resulting from his forced withdrawal from the partnership prior to the 
fust action); Winborne v. Doyle, Jr., 190 Va. 867, 59 S.E. (2d) 90 (1950) (declaratory 
judgment as to plaintiff's right to rents held no bar to a separate action for the fair rental 
value of the property); Cooke v. Gaidry, 309 Ky. 727, 218 S.W. (2d) 960 (1949) (here 
note the wording of the Kentucky Declaratory Judgment Act cited in the case, §639a-4, 
Civil Code of Practice); cf. Schleicher v. Schleicher, 120 Conn. 528, 182 A. 162 (1935). 
As to the effect of merger and bar in such a situation see JUDGMENTS REsTATEMENT §77, 
comment b (1942); 10 A.L.R. (2d) 787 (1950). 
8 2 ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 1059, §451 (1951). 
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rather than to supersede other causes of action. 9 As general propositions these 
assertions are no doubt true. However, it is submitted they are of little utility 
in deciding the issue presented in the principal case. It is generally recognized 
that executory or coercive relief may be sought either in association with or as 
a supplement to declaratory relief.10 Even though the operative facts which 
give rise to a coercive cause of action have accrued, the plaintiff if he so desires 
may seek the milder remedy of a declaratory judgment.11 Having done so the 
crucial question becomes whether or not he may, after the declaratory judgment, 
assert those same operative facts and obtain coercive relief under the "further 
relief'' provision of either the federal or uniform act.12 Here it is apparent 
that the majority of courts that have dealt with this problem have failed to 
distinguish between the plaintiff's right to coercive relief initially and his right 
to coercive relief after the declaratory judgment. In the latter case, either on 
the basis of res judicata or procedural necessity, further coercive relief should 
be confined to those situations in which the declaration is either disobeyed or 
disregarded.13 To allow the plaintiff to bring successive actions based on the 
same operative facts but on different grounds or theories is to sanction multi-
plicity.14 There is no indication that the declaratory judgment acts were 
intended to abrogate the rule that vexatious litigation is to be discouraged. In 
the principal case, it does not appear that the defendant had disregarded either 
the declaratory judgment or the injunction. Plaintiff's second action was pre-
dicated solely on acts occurring prior to the declaratory judgment and since in 
Colorado a claim for damages may be asserted in a declaratory proceeding, it is 
submitted that the principal case reached a correct result. 
Robert G. Russell, S.Ed. 
9 Winborne v. Doyle, Jr., note 7 supra. 
lOBoRCHARD, DEcLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., 438 (1941). 
11 Id. at 315. Borchard states that there are two general types of action in which 
declaratory relief may be invoked: (1) actions in which no coercive relief is sought or even 
possible, i.e., where the plaintiff seeks a declaration that he is privileged to act, and (2) 
actions where the plaintiff, though capable of suing for an executory or coercive relief, 
contents himself with the milder declaration of rights as adequate to his need and purpose. 
See Kaleikau v. Hall, 27 Hawaii 420 (1923), where declaratory relief was refused because 
another remedy was available. 
12 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2202; 9 U.L.A. 342, §8 (1951). That further relief 
is limited to further declaratory relief see Brindley v. Meara, 209 Ind. 144, 198 N.E. 301 
(1935). Contra: Morris v. Ellis, 221 Wis. 307, 266 N.W. 921 (1936). See Borchard, 
"An Indiana Declaratory Judgment," 11 hm. L.J. 376 (1936). 
13 That is, the proceeding would be ancillary and would be based on the court's in-
herent power to issue orders to enforce its own judgments or decrees. See BoRCHAlID, DE-
CLARATORY JtmGMBNTs, 2d ed., 441 (1941): "Consequential or executory relief may be 
demanded either in association with or as a supplement to declaratory relief, should the 
declaration be not observed and coercion become necessary. • • • Since further or coercive 
relief could have been demanded in combination with the declaration, in the same action, 
there is no reason why it cannot be demanded in an ·ancillary motion should the declaration 
be disobeyed or disregarded." See also id. at 500-501. 
14 As to whether a decree granting or refusing an injunction (not in a declaratory 
proceeding) is res judicata in an action for damages in relation to a matter concerning which 
the injunction was asked in the first suit see 26 A.L.R. (2d) 446 (1952); Newby v. Bock, 
